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Abstract 
Both theoretical and applied  research have been devoting much attention to the fact that 
large and growing shares of international trade flows among industrialized countries consist of 
intermediate goods. The new configuration of the productive structure underlying such 
phenomenon has been named ‘internationally fragmented’. In this paper we investigate patterns 
and determinants of trade originated by a specific form of fragmentation, that is, that form 
giving rise to international trade for reasons of processing. Data on textile and apparel trade 
between major EU countries and six major Central-European countries show that the 
magnitude of traffic for reasons of processing greatly overshadows that of final trade. The 
implication is that the industry appears to be affected by a process of international 
fragmentation whose understanding requires a new definition of the concept of comparative 
advantage. Our analysis suggests that the process of transferring abroad more or less extensive 
segments of previously integrated production processes is activated by labor cost differentials 
as well as by reasons of geographic and cultural proximity. However, once the process has been 
activated, EU firms appear not to favor a strategy of further decentralization of production in 
the least-wage country. Rather, there is evidence that in time further segments of the production 
processes are allocated to the partner country originally chosen. 
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1. Introduction 
The economic literature has devoted much attention to the process of integration of the world's 
economies and the consequences of this phenomenon.  Among the different forms of economic 
integration, one that recently received increasing consideration is the process whereby 
previously integrated productive activities are segmented and spread over an international 
network of production sites. Accordingly, and in contrast with the traditional paradigm of 
international trade theory, evidence suggests that today the largest share of world trade takes 
place in intermediate goods, and final consumer goods sold in one country are often the 
assembly of manufacturing processes that take place in many different locations.  In light of this 
notion, the usual analysis of the determinants of trade patterns and countries' specialization 
needs to be reconsidered. 
The aim of this paper is to understand determinants of trade patterns in the presence of 
international fragmentation of production. The paper focuses on a specific -albeit very relevant- 
case, analyzing some recent changes in the pattern of production and trade in the textile and 
apparel (TA) industry in Europe. The TA industry is an excellent example of economic 
integration among countries through international delocalization of production, it being an 
industry affected by this process more than many others. As a consequence of the increasing 
competition, especially from low-cost producers, European Union producers of textile and 
apparel pursued strategies aiming at the reduction of their production costs. This required a 
number of changes in the organization of production, and resulted in the shift of the labor-
intensive production phases toward countries characterized by relatively low labor costs, while 
maintaining in the producers' home countries the fundamental phases of creation and 
distribution of the goods. Abundant evidence on this phenomenon can be found in the data on 
outward processing trade between Western and Central-Eastern Europe. 
  The work is organized as follows. After reviewing the basic features of international 
fragmentation of production in section 2, data on outward processing trade in the TA sector 
(from the Eurostat-Comext database) are analyzed in the third section at a  disaggregated level 
to assess the specific features of the recourse to segmentation of production by different 
European countries. The role of trade liberalization and geographic proximity between countries 
characterized by different factor prices in the process of international delocalization of 
production phases are also examined. The results show different models of delocalization used 
by different producers and varying degrees of integration between production and trade 
partners. The collected evidence indicates that the extent and forms of the delocalization of 
production in this sector are driven essentially by EU producers rather than by host countries' 
characteristics. 
These findings constitute the basis of the econometric exercise presented in section 4. The 
exercise aims at verifying whether delocalization of production can indeed be modeled as a   3
cost-minimizing decision by EU producers, in line with theoretical predictions, and which are 
the key variables in this process. 
 
 
2. International fragmentation of production and trade flows 
Recent work on fragmentation of production moves from the observation that international trade 
flows in the last decades have been increasing at faster rates than world production, so that 
nearly all countries today exhibit a higher trade/GDP ratio than forty years ago. The 
explanations coming to mind for the increased openness of countries are the decline in 
international transaction costs (in a very broad sense) and the process of trade liberalization that 
characterized the period after World War II (Krugman 1995).  It can be observed that trade 
flows changed not only in terms of quantity, but in terms of quality as well. The share of basic 
commodities and natural resources in trade flows has been declining constantly, while trade in 
manufactured goods increased, as well as trade in services. Furthermore, trade in capital goods 
and intermediate inputs takes up now a substantial share of total trade (Feenstra, 1998). Jones 
and Kierzkowski (1997) argue that the increase of trade/GDP ratios is due not only to an 
extension in the number of goods and services that are tradable, but also to the fact that a larger 
part of countries' economies is  intensively affected by trade, and name this process intensive 
growth of international trade. 
The reason for this changing nature of world trade seems to be primarily 
internationalization of production (Hummels et al., 1998). Internationalization of production is 
normally associated with the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Rather than 
concentrate production in a single country, an MNE owning production plants in different 
locations can split up production in different countries, so to exploit location advantages, such 
as easier access to the needed resources or proximity to markets. MNEs' activities give rise to 
increased trade flows  when the production process of the firm is vertically integrated, that is 
when different phases of production take place in different countries, and intermediate goods are 
moved from one plant to another. But this sequential mode of production can also take place 
outside of MNEs. The ways in which international fragmentation of production takes place are 
in fact varied
1. Producers in one country may decide to delocalize phases of the production 
process in other countries without creating and owning production plants abroad, but simply by 
negotiating a purchasing agreement with foreign producers.  It is also possible to observe 
"spontaneous" vertical specialization of countries: different countries specialize in different 
goods, which are exported and can be used as inputs for production of other goods. In these 
                                                           
1 It is maybe because of this reason that many different terms are used in the literature for the process we are describing, 
where a final good is the result of a production process that takes place in different locations. Some of the terms are 
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specialization, outsourcing.   4
cases, international fragmentation of production is carried out in arms-length transactions: a 
country imports a good from another country, uses that good as an input in the production of its 
own good, which is then exported to the next country (which can - but needs not to - be the 
initial one).  This disintegration of production in itself leads to more trade, as intermediate 
inputs cross borders several times during the manufacturing process. 
International fragmentation of production will occur if some conditions are met. First of 
all, production technology must allow to effectively split production into different stages that 
can be carried out in different locations. In general, the different stages of production should be 
characterized by different technologies (such as different factor intensities) that can exploit 
countries’ differences. We can assume that fragmentation is costly, in that it requires resources 
to coordinate production internationally, but according to the prices of the final and intermediate 
goods, coordination and transportation costs can be low enough to make the process 
economically convenient (Deardorff, 1998b). In this case, fragmentation of production will 
substitute integrated production. 
It seems that these conditions actually occur in the real world in a number of sectors. 
Hummels et al. (1998) show the increasingly important role played by vertical specialization (or 
specialization in different phases of production) in trade, as vertical specialization has been 
growing more rapidly than horizontal specialization.  The factors that spurred the increase of 
trade in the last decades (decline in communication and coordination costs, and trade 
liberalization) seem to favor especially vertical trade. In fact, when a good crosses multiple 
borders, like it happens with vertical trade, the incidence of tariffs and other barriers to trade is 
multiplied.   
New patterns of production and trade may emerge in response to international 
fragmentation of production. As shown in trade models with fragmentation of production, the 
splitting up of the production process may give a country a comparative advantage in a good 
where it had no advantage before (Deardorff, 1998a). Having a comparative advantage in a 
single production stage may allow a country to branch into international markets without any 
need to be an efficient producer of the entire product. Therefore fragmentation of production 
may lead to major changes in specialization of countries, as fragmentation of an activity not 
originally produced may allow some segments of this activity to start up (Jones and 
Kierzkowski, 1997). This is even more likely to be the case when some phases of production are 
intentionally delocalized by producers in one country toward other countries. A particularly 
relevant case modeled by Jones and Kierzkowski (1997) is the one of a labor-abundant country 
which proves non-competitive in the production of an integrated activity which may, after 
fragmentation, be able to produce some labor-intensive segments. The theoretical model also 
shows that fragmentation of production may allow a relatively capital-abundant country that 
looses its comparative advantage in a labor-intensive good to retain a comparative advantage in   5
important phases of production of that good. 
Trade between the EU and the CEECs is a significant example of such an occurrence. In a 
number of industries, growth of trade in intermediate inputs between Eastern and Western 
Europe outpaces trade in final commodities. Hoekman and Djankov (1997) find that imports of 
inputs are highly correlated with the composition of exports from the CEECs, and their analysis 
suggests that in many CEECs, imports of intermediate goods drove the changes in export 
structure observed during the 1990s. We argue here that - at least in some sectors - the observed 
imports of intermediate goods are not activated by the CEECs themselves, but are the result of a 
process of delocalization of production originated and controlled by EU producers. 
The textile and apparel (TA) industry is one of the industries where the changes in 
specialization driven by international fragmentation of production can be observed more clearly. 
Spinanger (1995) observes that the above-mentioned conditions for fragmentation of production 
to take place are met quite precisely in the case of splitting apparel production between the EU 
(and Germany in particular) and the former Socialist countries. As a consequence of this 
fragmentation, on one hand, we see that the CEECs' export shares in TA products have 
increased remarkably, and the CEECs have been consolidating, at least until 1996, their 
comparative advantage in these labor-intensive products (Guerrieri, 1998). On the other hand, 
we observe that temporary exports of these goods from the EU to be processed in the CEECs 
increased as well. This evidence and its implication for specialization are discussed in the 
following section.   
 
 
3. Changes in production and trade patterns of the European TA industry 
 
3.1 Relevance of OPT 
Most of the empirical work on international fragmentation of production is based on a very 
general definition of fragmentation, generally measured through volumes of trade flows in 
intermediate goods or components.  In this paper we adopt a much stricter definition of the 
phenomenon: international fragmentation of production takes place when firm A (located in 
country A) farms out to firm B (located in country B) segments of a previously integrated, in-
house production process. While it is immaterial, for the purposes of this paper, whether firm A 
directly or indirectly controls firm B, it is relevant to spell out the basics of the contractual 
relationship established between firm A (the principal, or main producer) and firm B (the agent, 
or sub-contractor). We postulate that the two firms agree to the following conditions: (1) the 
main producer supplies the foreign sub-contractor with the intermediate products (inputs) the 
latter is to process; (2) the main producer supplies the sub-contractor with detailed product-and-
process specifications (blueprints) to which the sub-contractor is bound to abide; (3) in general,   6
the principal retains the right to carry out quality controls and to reject the agent’s output on the 
basis of quality, timing of delivery, and other agreed-upon contractual conditions; (4) the 
principal retains ownership rights over the inputs supplied to the agent and is committed to 
collect his output after the specified processes have been carried out; (5) the principal retains the 
right to market the final product or to subject it to further processing as necessary. 
International flows of goods originated as a consequence of contractual relationships of 
the type just described are known as Outward Processing Traffic (OPT), which is nothing other 
than international shipments for the purpose of processing abroad and consequent re-import. 
Data on OPT are collected at a very high level of merchandise disaggregation since 1988 at the 
EU member country level, the reason for data collection about this special type of traffic being 
that goods reimported after processing abroad are subject to customs treatment particularly 
advantageous relative to final imports. The data set thus assembled allows for the monitoring of 
the international sequel of the production process, because the reimported goods must clearly 
contain the goods originally shipped abroad for processing if they are to be admitted to the 
customs preferential treatment. 
Being collected to register a very specific type of international traffic of goods, OPT data 
necessarily underestimate the extent of international fragmentation of production in its general 
definition (see footnote 1). Yet, we believe that it is primarily using this type of data that one 
can pinpoint features and extent of that phenomenon elsewhere defined as ‘international trade in 
production processes’ (Baldone, Sdogati and Zucchetti, 1997), for what OPT data capture is the 
extent to which previously in-house held production processes are disintegrated internationally 
in a manner that allows the originator of the outward traffic to control the whole production 
process according to its own specifications. 
The importance of OPT relative to domestic production is highlighted in Table 3.1, which 
reports both levels of OPT and domestic production (at current prices) and the ratio of the 
former to the latter. It is apparent that the strong-currency countries, that is Germany and the 
Netherlands, exhibit a substantially larger access to the OPT practice relative to the value of 
domestic production. When measured by apparel reimports, such ratio grows from 11% to 26% 
between 1989 and 1996 in the case of Germany and from 20% to 43% in the case of the 
Netherlands, vis-a-vis a much smaller, though also growing, ratio for France and Italy. It is most 
interesting to point out that the ratio of apparel production to textile production is generally 
lower for the countries with the more widespread access to the OPT practice, and that sizable 
increases in the access to OPT take place at the same time as domestic production contractions. 
A possible causal interpretation of this evidence is that growing competitive pressures from low 
labor-cost countries negatively affect domestic production and make it necessary to increase the 
access to the OPT practice as a means to achieve the reduction of production costs necessary to 




Three more features of the ‘German model’ of OPT are highlighted by Table 3.1. First, 
Germany is the country with the longest tradition in the practice of OPT in both textile and 
apparel; second, it is the country showing the largest recourse to the practice still in 1996 (the 
latest year for which final production data are available for most countries); and third, it is the 
country comparatively exporting to the CEECs relatively more textiles that apparel. 
We have shown in a related paper (Baldone, Sdogati and Tajoli, 1999) that for any given 
EU country the weights of each merchandise group are not distributed uniformly across CEECs. 
We have postulated that such phenomenon may be due 
1. to differences in the degree to which the process of International Delocalization of 
Production (IDP) is being pushed, according to the size of the array of production segments  
being delocalized. The existence of different degrees to which segments of the production 
process are disintegrated internationally may be due to differing degrees of reliability and 
technical skills shown by the CEECs, skills and reliability being themselves a function of the 
length and intensity of previous arrangements; 
2. to differences in the merchandises being subjected to OPT. 
2 
 
Lest the ratio of OPT to domestic production leave doubts about the relevance of 
international trade due to processing reasons, evidence about the relative weight of OPT to final 
trade, shown in Table 3.2, should dispel them. In 1996, at the peak of the phenomenon, the 
value of EU-4 re-imports from the CEECs-6 was on average thrice as much as the value of final 





In the next section we discuss evidence about the first of these possible explanations for 
the existence of unequal distribution of weights of merchandise groupings across CEECs for 
any given EU country. This is accomplished by analysing first the structural differences in the 
composition of traffic between each EU country and the relevant CEECs, and then the 
differences between each CEEC and the relevant EU countries. 
 
                                                           
2 In Baldone, Sdogati and Tajoli (1999) we found, for instance, that a high weight of re-imports of knitted products over 
total re-imports of clothing is associated with a high weight of temporary exports of clothing. 
3 The reason the ratio sistematically falls in 1997 in virtually all instances is a statistical one, and has no implication as 
far as the recourse to the economic practice of IDP is concerned. Indeed, the reduction (often to zero) of EU import 
duties from many of the CEECs that took place on January first, 1997 have made it not only unnecessary for EU 
producers to apply for permission to access the OPT system, but also to face the unnecessary cost required to go   8
3.2 Do structures of traffic differ across EU countries (the principals)? 
The issue of whether principals specialize in the temporary export (reimport) of some 
merchandise groupings was addressed in two steps. First, we computed the weights of each 
merchandise grouping over total outward processing traffic for each principal relative to all 
agents. The differences in the principals' structures were then measured through the 
Standardized Euclidean Distance (SED).
4   
 
Table 3.3 reports the dynamics of SED between each of the major EU member countries 
and Germany relative to the aggregate of the CEECs for the aggregate TA flows. It is apparent 
that the first half of the sample period is characterized by a reduction in structural differences, 
whereas in the second half the process of structural convergence comes to a stop. Indeed, with 
the only exception of Netherlands, structural differences between the commodity structure of 
OPT traffic do persist, and France’s even increases, relative to the German model of 
specialization.   
 
[TABLES 3.3 AND 3.4] 
 
The most important feature of such differences appears to be the distribution of the 
relative weight of apparel in re-imports relative to their distribution in temporary exports: over 
the last three years French and Italian re-imports of apparel consist of goods originally 
temporarily exported under the heading ‘apparel’consistently  to a much larger proportion than 
is the case for Germany (34% and 27% for France and Germany respectively, against a three-
year average of 13% and 11% for Germany and the Netherlands respectively). We interpret 
these differences as an indicator of the fact that Germany and the Netherlands have been 
transferring to the CEECs a larger number of segments of the overall textile-to-apparel 
production process than France and Italy, the latter being countries shipping abroad relatively 
more apparel to be subjected to ‘only’ terminal phases of production abroad. 
Further disaggregation of the commodity bundles ‘textiles’ (chapters coded 50 through 60 
of the Combined Nomenclature) and ‘apparel’ (chapters coded  61 and 62) into chapters allows 
for a more detailed breakdown of structural differences in the composition of OPT by each EU 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
through the application process.    
4 SED is computed as 
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where N is the number of merchandise groupings onto which total traffic is disaggregated, qi,G  is each grouping’s share 
in German traffic, and qi,m  is each grouping’s share in country m's traffic. Since individual structures are defined over 
the unit complex, the maximum Euclidean distance between any two of them is  √ 2. It follows that SED can take on 
values in the interval between 0 (identical structures) and 1 (when the structures are entirely identified by two different 
commodities). 
   9




-  the (already found, albeit at a different level of product aggregation) greater similarity 
between the composition of Dutch and German OP traffic in both directions; 
-  the greater weight of semi-finished products in the temporary exports of France and Italy 
relative to Germany and the Netherlands;  
-  the greater weight of natural-fiber textiles (wool and, especially, cotton) in the overall 
temporary exports of Germany and Italy relative to those of France and the Netherlands; 
-  the greater relevance that temporary exports of man-made fibres and textiles have for 
Germany and the Netherlands than they do for France and Italy on average; 
-  the different composition of temporary exports of man-made fibres and filaments for 
Germany, the Netherlands and and France on the on hand and Italy on the other, with the 
former group specializing in temporary exports of man-made staple fibers, whereas Italy 
specializes in temporary exports of man-made filaments; 
-  for Italy, and even more so for France, the importance of temporary exports of articles of 
apparel and clothing accessories, whether or not knitted or crocheted’ (Chapters 61 and 62 
of the CN) relative to those of more up-stream intermediate products. 
 
Summarizing, two ‘models’ seem to emerge from the available evidence. On the hand 
one can identify a ‘Dutch-German model’ of international delocalization of production, a model 
characterized by a tendency to transfer abroad a larger number of segments of the production 
process –as revealed by the larger share of textiles temporarily exported from these countries 
and re-imported directly as ‘apparel’; and a ‘French-Italian‘ model which differ from the former 
in that we witness a preference to temporarily export products already classified as ‘apparel’, 
that is, a tendency to let finish abroad products already at an advanced stage of completion. It is 
worth emphasizing that such differences are also due to different national legislations 
implementing EU regulations. In particular, the more restrictive implementation in Italy is 
certainly due to the cautious approach to OPT taken by Italian trade unions, relatively more 
concerned about the potentially adverse employment effects of the practice, but it is also true 
that EU legislation was modelled upon the characteristics OPT had in the past, when it was 
basically a 'German' phenomenon. 
The second step we have taken to assess the extent to which each principal may be said to 
specialize was to look at the relative composition of traffic for each couple principal-agent.  In 
order to uncover potentially different patterns of specialization we take Poland’s commodity 






It is immediately apparent that Germany exhibits a structure of traffic with each of the 
agents markedly different from that it exhibits relative to Poland. Such difference is least for 
Germany relative to the other principals and, over the later years of the sample, for Italy, than 
for France and the Netherlands.  In general, it would appear that the principal’s choice of agents 
has implications not only in terms of volume of overall traffic but also, to some extent, for its 
commodity composition as well. Thus, the problem arises as to the extent to which the choice of 
agent by each of the principals is guided not only by its own specialization, but also by the 
productive specialization of the agent.  
 
3.3 Do Agents Specialize? 
If agents were significantly specialized in specific (though potentially extended) segments 
of the production process, then one should expect that flows of traffic from (and to) a given 
agent would be similar for different principals in terms of commodity composition of traffic. 
This is to say that if agent A exhibited a comparative advantage in carrying out a specific 
segments in the value-added chain, then one should observe that the commodity composition of 
outgoing traffic should be similar across principals, and similarly for the incoming traffic. Table 




The evidence thus generated leads to the conclusion that, for any given agent, the 
structural differences among the traffic generated by each principal are smaller for those 
segments of the production process involving transformation of textiles into apparel rather than 
those involving only the terminal parts of transformation of apparel, the latter requiring more 
labor-intensive technologies relative to the former.  This finding is complemented by the 
previously identified one, that is, that Germany is the country originating the largest volume of 
traffic and, at the same time, the least differentiating among its agents. We view the evidence as 
suggesting rather strongly that the CEECs involved in product processing originated im the EU 
do not exhibit relevant degrees of production specialization.  
It follows that structural differences in the commodity composition of traffic are 
determined more by individual strategies of the principals than by the agents’ specialization. 
                                                           
5 The choice of Poland as a benchmark is due to the fact that it is a most relevant partner for all the principals, and at 
times even the most important one. Italy being an exception to this pattern, we have also adopted Hungary as a 
benchmark in this instance.   11
The case of Romania (Table 3.7 (b), and see Baldone, Sdogati and Tajoli 1999) lends itself 
particularly well to this interpretation. It is also worth noting that Bulgaria, the least 
homogeneous country to the EU relative to all other CEECs, and possibly the least ready to 
practice IDP due to both institutional and industrial considerations, is on average the country 
with the least degree of differentiation with respect to both comparisons we have run –the one 
with respect to each principal’s traffic with Poland and the other  with respect to each agent. Our 
interpretation of this evidence is that the choice of this agent by the principal is due to the low 
cost of labor associated with a high degree of standardization of the segments of the production 
it carries out. 
 
 
4. The choice to delocalize production toward the CEECs: econometric evidence 
The evidence discussed above indicates that international fragmentation of production in the TA 
sector in Europe can be ascribed to a large extent to the decision by EU apparel producers to 
delocalize labor-intensive phases of production in the CEECs, rather than to the autonomous 
development of a comparative advantage in this industry by the CEECs
6. To understand patterns 
of specialization and trade, a relevant question is therefore what drives the decision of EU 
producer to delocalize production in one country rather than another. To answer this question 
we first look for country-specific variables that are correlated to OPT, by running a regression 
of the share of each CEEC in OPT over a number of variables that intuitively could explain such 
choice. The estimated coefficients show which variables are correlated (positively or negatively)  
with the decision to delocalize.  
Given the short time series of data available for our estimates (the first relevant year for 
our series is 1989), we run a panel regression for the period 1989-1996 and the four CEECs 
(Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania) for which series are complete over this time span.
7 
The estimated equation, in its general form, is the following: 
 
(4.1)            OPTSHAREi,t = α i + β Wi,t +  γ  PROX i,t + δ  CHAR i,t + ε  i,t 
 
where OPTSHARE is the value of EU re-imports from a given country i over the total value of 
re-imports from the CEECs, W represents  wages in the CEECs, PROX is a set of variables used 
to indicate proximity (geographical and economic) between the trading partners, CHAR is any 
variable representing CEECs' characteristics that may favor location of TA production, such as 
the pre-existence of a well-developed industrial structure or a substantial TA industry, t is a time 
                                                           
6 The fact that OPT flows in TA are much larger than final TA flows between EU and the CEECs is also supportive of 
this interpretation. 
7 Czech Republic and Slovakia were discarded because of the discontinuity produced in the series by the splitting of the 
two countries in 1992.   12
index, and Greek letters are parameters. Different specifications were tested, using all the 
variables of equation (4.1), or only part of them, using the absolute level of salaries, rather than 
the ratio between the CEECs and the UE wages, and using different proximity measures. 




The results indicate that wages seem to be the single most important variable correlated 
with OPT flows, supporting the assumption that delocalization of production takes place in the 
most labor-intensive segments, in order to save on production (labor) costs. The coefficient on 
the wage variable is negative (as expected) in all specifications and always statistically 
significant at the 0.95 level at least.  This result is robust to changes in the specification of the 
regression (such as using different explanatory variables) and to changes in the variable itself, 
which was used in the regressions both in absolute terms and relative to the average wage level 
in the EU
8.  
Different variables were tested to verify the influence of links between the CEECs and 
the EU. As a proxy of the economic integration between the two areas we used both the stock of  
foreign direct investments (FDI) into each CEEC, and the average level of tariff imposed by the 
EU on imports from the CEECs.  While the coefficient of this last variable always displays the 
expected negative sign (we assume that higher tariffs imply a lower level of integration that can 
discourage delocalization of production), it is not always significant. This is not a surprising 
result, considering that the level of tariffs imposed by the EU on Eastern trade flows was very 
low already in the early 1990s, and it declined rapidly as the liberalization process between the 
two areas proceeded. Furthermore, TA re-imports are partially exempted from border duties, 
and this is one of the reasons for their fast growth during the last decade.  Therefore, we cannot 
read tariff level as a direct obstacle to OPT flows, but we used this variable to test for 
correlation between delocalization of production and a measure of economic integration (in the 
traditional sense) between EU and the CEECs. One possible interpretation of the result is that 
tariffs by themselves are not a good measure of such integration. A similar interpretation can be 
given to the FDI variable. The FDI stock variable displays very poor results, being significant 
with the expected positive sign only in one case.  Our evidence seems too weak to allow to 
conclude whether fragmentation of production is positively correlated to other, more traditional, 
forms of integration between countries, even if some results point in that direction. This is 
certainly an important aspect of the phenomenon that deserves further inquiries. 
We also tested if OPT flows are correlated to geographic proximity, as a reduction of 
                                                           
8 The coefficient of the wage variable was statistically significant when the variable was used in the regression 
simultaneously and also lagged one period. In the final specification we chose to use the lagged variable to reduce 
possible endogeneity problems.    13
transportation costs should foster delocalization of production. The variable used was a dummy 
that indicates the distance of each country from the EU border. This variable turns out to be 
significant in most regressions, but when it is used in the regression together with particular 
indicators of economic integration, a problem of multicollinearity emerges, and significance 
disappears. Finally, the country's characteristic we tested for was the importance of the apparel 
sector in each CEEC at the beginning of the period, in the presumption that experience in this 
kind of manufacturing could be relevant in the decision to delocalize production
9. The 
coefficient on this variable always has the expected positive sign, but it is non-significant in 
most cases.  The existence of a large apparel sector does not appear as a crucial factor in the 
decision to delocalize. 
In all regressions, we included a lagged dependent variable both for economic and 
statistical reasons. It seems plausible that OTP flows do not shift rapidly between countries and 
that some persistence exist in this variable. The use of this variable in the regressions also 
eliminated the problem of serial correlation in the residuals.
10  
Regressions similar to the ones presented in Table 4.1 were also performed referring to 
German and Italian OPT respectively. That is, we used as dependent variable the value of re-
imports of Germany (or Italy) from a given country i over the total value of re-imports from the 
CEECs toward Germany (or Italy). Results remained very similar to those obtained through the 
total EU regressions, and the robustness of the coefficient on the wage variable was confirmed, 
being always negative and significant. The only remarkable difference in the regressions run for 
each country separately is that the coefficient on the distance dummy for Italy was either non-
significant or negative, contrary to what occurred for the whole EU. 
Given these preliminary results, it is indeed reasonable to see OPT flows of apparel 
toward the CEECs as the result of the decision to delocalize phases of production in order to 
minimize costs
11. The solution to the problem of minimizing production costs produces a set of 
input demands. This allows us to model re-imports of apparel from the CEECs as input demand 
functions, that can be conveniently modeled using a flexible functional form. As shown by 
Kohli (1991), geographically disaggregated import functions can be modeled in this way. 
Following Kohli (1991), such a function will take the form of a translog import function, where 
the demand for each import component can be expresses in share form, with the share of 
imports (re-imports, in our case) from each country as the dependent variable, and the price of  
imports as the explanatory variables.  
Here ‘prices’ are the costs of the re-imported manufactured goods. Given the labor-
                                                           
9 When proxied by the relevance of manufacturing at large, the country's characteristic turns out to be consistently 
irrelevant. 
10 A Durbin’s h-test performed for all regressions presented in Table 4.1 accepted the hypothesis of no serial   
correlation in the residuals. 
11 The increasing competitive pressure on industrialized countries’ producers and the loss of comparative advantage in 
many segments of TA production support the view that EU producers should follow a cost-minimizing strategy.    14
intensive production delocalized in the CEECs, we will assume that the relative price of re-
imports is given primarily by relative wages in each country.  Therefore, the system of 
equations to be estimated is the following: 
 
   s i = α i +∑ β ij log(Wj)      i,j = Bul, Pol, Rum, Hun, Cze 
 
where s is the share of each country in re-imports of apparel toward the EU, and W are wages. 
To implement the model, we divide the first four wages by the fifth, thus eliminating the 
last term in each row and column of the parameter matrix, and we drop the fifth share equation 
to obtain a nonsingular system.
12 Therefore we end up estimating the following system of four 
equations, one for each CEEC, where the share of OPT from  country i is regressed against the 
wage in all the countries of our sample.
13 
 
(4.2)   OPTSHAREBul,t = α Bul + β Bul,Bul log(WBul,t/WCze,t) + β Bul,Pol log(WPol,t/WCze,t)  
+ β Bul,Rum log(WRum,t/WCze,t) + β Bul,Hun log(WHun,t /WCze,t ) + δ  Bul OPTSHAREBul,t-1 
 
OPTSHAREPol,t = α Pol + β Bul,Pol log(WBul,t/WCze,t) + β Pol,Pol log(WPol,t/WCze,t)  
+ β Pol,Rum log(WRum,t/WCze,t) + β Pol,Hun log(WHun,t /WCze,t ) + δ  Pol OPTSHAREPol,t-1 
 
OPTSHARERum,t = α Rum + β Bul,Rum log(WBul,t/WCze,t) + β Pol, Rum log(WPol,t/WCze,t)  
+ β Rum,Rum log(WRum,t/WCze,t) + β Rum,Hun log(WHun,t /WCze,t ) + 
 δ Rum OPTSHARE Rum ,t-1 
 
OPTSHAREHun,t = α Hun + β Bul,Hun log(WBul,t/WCze,t) + β Pol,Hun log(WPol,t/WCze,t)  
+ β Rum,Hun log(WRum,t/WCze,t) + β  Hun,Hun log(WHun,t /WCze,t ) +  
δ Hun OPTSHARE Hun ,t-1 
 
 
The system is estimated simultaneously, and imposing the symmetry of the cross-wage 
coefficients in all equations, using both an iterative seemingly unrelated regressions (ISUR) 
method, and a iterative three-stage-least square (I3SLS) estimation technique. It is quite natural 
to suspect that wages, our explanatory variables, are endogenous is such a system, as the 
                                                           
12 For details on the appropriate estimation method for such a system derived from a translog function, see Greene 
(1997), Ch. 15. 
13 The estimation methods chosen compute maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters, to ensure invariance with 
respect to the choice of which share equation to drop (see Greene, 1997). In this system we dropped the equation   15
demand for labor in the CEECs is likely to be influenced by foreign demand of the goods 
produced. This problem is dealt with by using wage variables lagged by one period when 
estimating using the ISUR method, and by using the I3SLS estimator, as suggested by Kohli 
(1991). We added a lagged dependent variable in all equations, because there is evidence of 
serial correlation, which is eliminated in this way. ISUR and I3SLS estimates of the system 




The two different methods produce fairly similar results in terms of overall goodness of 
fit of the equations and signs of the coefficients. Estimates show that wages in the CEECs are 
indeed a very relevant variable, as the good fit of all equations shows. The direct effect of its 
own wage level on each country's OPT share is always negative, as expected, even if 
significance is not robust. Estimates obtained through either ISUR or I3SLS methods for the 
impact of direct wages show a significant negative effect in the case of Poland and Hungary.  
These are the two countries where wages increased more rapidly during the past decade, and  it 
is plausible that the negative effect on the choice to delocalize in this case is stronger. Wage 
changes in Bulgaria and Romania appear to be less relevant, probably because salaries are still 
of an order of magnitude smaller than in the EU.  
Most cross-wage effects are non-significant, especially when the I3SLS estimation 
method was used. This result seems to indicate a low degree of substitutability or 
complementarity between production processes in different CEECs for the EU as a whole.
14 
Instead, the lagged dependent variable is in general very significant, and it brings an important 
contribution to the fit of the equations.  
  Also in this case, we estimated the equation system for Germany and Italy too, taken 
individually. For Germany, there is a high (and unsurprising) similarity in the results with the 
ones obtained for the whole EU, while more differences are registered for Italy. A difference to 
remark is that the goodness of fit of the equations is different for the two countries: the 
equations with the highest R-squared for Germany are the ones for Hungary and Poland, while 
for Italy the highest R-squared appears in the case of Hungary and Romania. In general, though, 
goodness of fit for Germany and Italy is lower than for the whole EU. 
  The results of these estimates show that national comparative advantage still has a role 
to play in the international division of labor, even in presence of international fragmentation of 
production. Labor costs are certainly important in determining trade patterns of a labor-intensive 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
relative to the Czech Republic to avoid problems of discontinuity in the dependent variable. 
14  It is interesting to note, though, that the cross-wage coefficient between Hungary and Romania is significant. 
Anecdotical evidence indicates that as wages increased rapidly in Hungary, delocalisation of production moved toward 
Romania, who experienced a fast increase in OPT flows.   16
commodity. It appears, though, that this is not enough to explain international trade flows when 
segmentation of production occurs. Relatively low substitutability among locations of 
production and indications of persistence in the model of delocalisation suggest that the 
exploitation of a latent comparative advantage in particular phases of production requires 
relevant start-up costs. In the case of the TA sector here examined, these costs are probably 




In this paper we dealt with a specific form of international fragmentation of production. In our 
definition, international fragmentation is characterized by two major features: first, an integrated 
production process previously located in one country is segmented and some of the segments 
are farmed out to foreign firms; second, the original producer retains property rights over the 
intermediate products supplied to the subcontractor. Our definition has two important 
implications: on the empirical level, it allows for detailed trade data to be used as a proxy for 
fragmentation; on the theoretical level, it makes it necessary to address the issue of what 
concept of ‘comparative advantage’ is relevant when firms no longer specialize in the 
production of goods but, rather, in specific segments of a production process. 
We started out by showing that our definition of fragmentation is only apparently narrow, 
for it originates the largest share of trade between the EU and the CEECs in the TA industry. 
We also documented that such practice appears to be negatively correlated with the levels of 
production in the process-originating countries, and postulated that OPT may be one the most 
important ways in which EU producers react to competitive pressures from low-wage 
competitors at least in labor intensive industries. 
Next we run a detailed analysis of the structure of trade for reasons of processing, and 
found out that there exist no evidence that the choice of processing country operated by EU 
firms is due to pre-existing comparative advantages (as traditionally defined) on the part of the 
latter in the given industry. Rather, our evidence suggests that the choice of foreign processing 
location rests on the EU firm. The implication of this finding is that we cannot read total trade 
flows from the CEECs as an indication of an autonomously developed comparative advantage.  
Preliminary econometric evidence confirms that labor costs, along with geographic and 
cultural proximity, are the most important reason for the original choice of a given country as a 
processing partner. However, there is robust evidence that, once the process has been activated, 
EU firms do not necessarily keep looking for the lowest labor cost country as the preferred 
partner: in particular, it would seem that once the processing country (firm) has been selected, 
EU firms tend to stay with that country even though lower labor cost countries open themselves 
up to the practice. Such is certainly the case of Germany, the earliest and most important   17
originator of OPT. On the other hand countries such as Italy, being both late-comers and prone 
to delocalize the most labor intensive segments of the production processes, tend to select 
partners much more on the basis of labor cost considerations. The upshot seems to be that once 
the processing-abroad practice has started, EU firms tend to delocalize in the country originally 
chosen more and more up-stream segments of the production process, rather than move the 
same labor intensive segments to countries with lower labor costs.  In this process of vertical re-
integration in the processing country foreign direct investment may be playing an important role 
as it allows, through direct proprietary control, a tighter supervision of processes and products.    18
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Tab. 3.1  Shares of OPT to domestic production. Major EU countries. 
      
Values (MEcu)  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Temporary exports       
Germany                  T  797.2  941.4  1143.8 1373.4 1548.4 1900.4 2156.5  2392.5  2400.6 2267.1
A 122.5 135.1 168.4 217.9 223.3 288.5 336.6 379.7 413.6 365.8
The Netherlands      T  97.4  113.5  135.7 149.5 166.0 183.2 122.9  222.0  310.4 249.9
A 13.7 17.4 20.3 27.1 31.1 35.7 26.6 40.9 62.9 43.5
France                      T  129.0  187.9  186.5 165.7 197.7 238.2 243.9  257.4  426.0 253.5
A 46.3 62.3 63.8 69.5 74.1 80.7 118.6  133.2  170.7 138.8
Italy                         T  7.5  18.6  23.6 45.0 82.6 142.5 200.7  250.5  311.5 346.1
A 2.4 4.3 4.9 12.4 32.6 48.7 87.4  123.3  190.5 236.4
      
Reimports       
Germany                  T  18.1  20.2  31.9 42.6 46.9 63.9 87.5  108.2  116.6 90.7
A 1253.9 1496.0 1847.1 2325.3 2434.6 2877.6 3355.8 3575.6 3717.0 3665.0
The Netherlands      T  0.3  0.2  0.3 0.4 0.4 1.2 1.3  1.6  2.7 7.9
A 160.6 177.1 209.3 237.2 281.6 314.3 371.2 469.9 445.6 358.6
France                      T  9.5  10.8  10.5 7.6 7.8 7.2 6.8  7.4  7.9 10.2
A 201.9 307.5 348.9 322.0 400.8 449.2 477.3 515.0 365.4 512.9
Italy                         T  0.9  1.4  1.4 1.5 3.0 7.3 21.9  29.9  35.5 35.5
A  7.4 25.2 26.7 61.0 117.8 192.4 317.6  418.0  617.1 697.3
      
Production        
Germany                  T  18499.1  19720.4  20582.8 20643.0 20234.8 18732.3 17632.3  16239.3  15303.3
A 13407.9 14128.1 15057.7 15898.7 15501.1 15457.7 15313.6 14910.7 14034.2
The Netherlands      T  2321.1  2399.7  2564.2 2567.5 2568.1 2727.6 2700.9  2886.5  3043.2
A 792.6 898.3 988.5 997.5 972.0 1010.2 1033.8 988.9  1029.2
France                      T  15717.6  16303.3  16702.8 15988.3 16291.9 15212.7 16421.2  16943.1 
A  9746.6 10187.1 10708.6 10489.4 10568.5 10248.6 10344.1  9972.5 
Italy                         T  37082.3  41040.9  41703.7 41565.8 40066.3 34308.9 37095.3  36029.3  37411.3
A 18895.8 20703.7 21812.3 22887.5 23247.5 17827.0 18543.8 18727.2 20088.9
      
 
Shares over production 
    
Temporary exports       
Germany                  T  0.043  0.048  0.056 0.067 0.077 0.101 0.122  0.147  0.157
A 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.014 0.014 0.019 0.022 0.025 0.029
The Netherlands      T  0.042  0.047  0.053 0.058 0.065 0.067 0.045  0.077  0.102
A 0.017 0.019 0.021 0.027 0.032 0.035 0.026 0.041 0.061
France                      T  0.008  0.012  0.011 0.010 0.012 0.016 0.015  0.015 
A 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.013 
Italy                         T  0.000  0.000  0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005  0.007  0.008
A 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.009
      
Reimports       
Germany                  T  0.001  0.001  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005  0.007  0.008
A 0.094 0.106 0.123 0.146 0.157 0.186 0.219 0.240 0.265
The Netherlands      T  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.001  0.001
A 0.203 0.197 0.212 0.238 0.290 0.311 0.359 0.475 0.433
France                      T  0.001  0.001  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
A 0.021 0.030 0.033 0.031 0.038 0.044 0.046 0.052 
Italy                         T  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001  0.001  0.001
A 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.011 0.017 0.022 0.031
 
Legenda: T = Textiles, A = Apparel 
  
Source: Eurostat, Comext and OECD, STAN database      20
  
Table 3.2     Shares of EU re-imports after processing in the CEECs-6 relative to final imports 
      
Germany  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
  Poland  3.73  5.39 4.67  5.17 4.25 4.76 6.67 6.71  6.21 2.22
  Czech R.  0.31  0.34 0.33  0.68 0.84 1.26 1.75 1.71  1.75 0.81
  Slovakia  0.31  0.34 0.33  0.68 0.84 1.51 1.86 1.67  2.05 1.69
  Hungary  3.43  3.73 3.04  3.51 2.46 2.5 3.39 3.64  3.89 2.22
  Romania  1.99  2.4 3.22  4.13 5.51 3.49 6.38 6.61  7.67 7.24
  Bulgaria  0.94  1.19 1.15  1.53 1.83 2.39 2.15 2.27  2.7 1.29
The Netherlands          
  Poland  1.39  2.73 2.04  3.06 4.89 3.85 4.87 10.53  8.53
  Czech R.  0.41  0.64 0.96  0.87 0.81 0.22 0.3 0.27  0.23 0.17
  Slovakia  0.41  0.64 0.96  0.87 0.81 1.62 1.4 3.42  4.21 2.22
  Hungary  3.76  5.31 4.93  8.07 9.07 5.83 5.01 10.23  5.51 2.92
  Romania  1.38  1.81 1.4  1.61 2.08 2.05 1.78 2.8  3.25 1.59
  Bulgaria  0.03  0 0.1  0.41 1.95 2.11 2.44 8.94  4.34 1.42
France      
  Poland  0.41  0.73 0.77  1.2 1.33 1.16 1.99 2.32  1.11 1.36
  Czech R.  0.01  0.01 0  0.15 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.48  0.27 0.22
  Slovakia  0.01  0.01 0  0.15 0.3 0.76 1.34 1.1  0.73 0.68
  Hungary  1.88  2.37 2.27  2.75 3.17 5.46 6.96 4.37  1.44 1.69
  Romania  0.35  0.4 0.52  0.63 2.46 2.1 1.67 1.96  1.28 1.79
  Bulgaria  0.11  0.21 0.34  0.48 0.26 0.21 0.37 0.95  0.93 0.72
Italy      
  Poland  0  0 0.02  0.14 0.33 0.97 1.03 0.69  1.41 0.88
  Czech R.  0  0 0  0.13 0.25 0.2 0.13 0.12  0.21 0.16
  Slovakia  0  0 0  0.13 0.25 0.81 0.44 0.52  1.19 0.88
  Hungary  0.02  0.09 0.21  0.66 1 2.46 2.39 2.6  3.11 1.98
  Romania  0.03  0.06 0.02  0.2 0.21 0.64 1.4 1.67  2.39 1.29
  Bulgaria  0  0.02 0.05  0.07 0.2 0.31 0.52 0.73  0.98 0.63
TOTAL      
  Poland  1.97  2.64 2.7  3.39 3.29 3.83 5.21 5.57  4.85 2.02
  Czech R.  0.24  0.29 0.3  0.56 0.69 0.95 1.18 1.2  1.26 0.65
  Slovakia  0.24  0.29 0.3  0.56 0.69 1.33 1.31 1.31  1.68 1.31
  Hungary  2.25  2.45 2.35  2.85 2.36 2.85 3.48 3.72  3.3 2.14
  Romania  0.84  0.95 1.23  1.46 2.05 2.1 3.1 3.34  3.69 2.74
  Bulgaria  0.53  0.65 0.7  0.87 0.91 1.21 1.2 1.6  1.8 0.97
      
G.  TOTAL 1.08 1.28 1.45 1.78 1.81 2.22 2.71 2.87 2.91 1.68
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Tab. 3.4 Relative Weight of Textile and Apparel to Reimports of Apparel by EU Country  
 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
G: TE-T/RI-A  0.60068  0.5993 0.63712 0.62444 0.6699 0.67924 0.65195 0.67381 0.66254 0.64812
G: TE-A/RI-A  0.08579  0.08 0.09135 0.10381 0.10914 0.12035 0.11773 0.12644 0.13788 0.1342
G: RI-T/RI-A  0.00339  0.00462 0.01941 0.0203 0.01834 0.02008 0.02703 0.03079 0.03881 0.02837
  
NL: TE-T/RI-A  0.61912  0.55482 0.56475 0.51429 0.51558 0.45409 0.22304 0.3268 0.49966 0.44919
NL: TE-A/RI-A  0.03337  0.02869 0.04458 0.11117 0.1137 0.10142 0.05298 0.08849 0.14207 0.09897
NL: RI-T/RI-A  0.00102  0.00069 0.00184 0.00245 0.00114 0.00158 0.00213 0.00277 0.00362 0.0038
  
F: TE-T/RI-A  0.66081  0.62253 0.68851 0.57639 0.43601 0.4685 0.45078 0.41694 0.60411 0.38336
F: TE-A/RI-A  0.58149  0.51089 0.50448 0.4167 0.29252 0.27908 0.31562 0.31739 0.40044 0.34074
F: RI-T/RI-A  0.00701  0.017 0.00764 0.00186 0.00303 0.00837 0.01035 0.00435 0.01157 0.00989
  
I: TE-T/RI-A  0.97267  0.98203 0.75009 0.77691 0.65748 0.6377 0.54962 0.52706
I: TE-A/RI-A  0.0187  0.03486 0.13586 0.20681 0.29259 0.23592 0.2324 0.25272 0.26336 0.3152
I: RI-T/RI-A  0  0 0 6.1E-05 0.01953 0.0332 0.06516 0.06825 0.06128 0.05619
Legenda: G Germany; NL Netherlands; F France; I Italy; TE Temporary Exports; RI Reimports ;T Textile; A Apparel. 
Source: Eurostat, Comext. 
 
Tab. 3.5 Structure  of  EU Temporary Exports  to, and Reimports from, CEECs-6 in 1996 and 1990  
 
Temporary Exports 1996 
 
Reimports 1996 
         
CN  
Code 
G NL F  I    G NL F  I 
50 0.00384  0.00042  0.00127  0.0058 9.4E-06 0  0 0
51  0.14259 0.11466  0.1098 0.12556 0.00946 2.6E-05 0.00079 0.00508
52  0.1679 0.12009 0.07865 0.17012 0.00495 3.7E-05 0.00021 0.0155
53  0.01399 0.00881  0.0138 0.00747 4.9E-05 0 0.00599 0.00125
54  0.12792 0.07518 0.03396 0.16954 0.00552 4.5E-05 0.00033 0.02155
55  0.18948 0.28659 0.21187 0.07913 0.00638 6.7E-05 0.00055 0.00726
56  0.03204 0.02107 0.01258 0.02359 0.00125 0.00047 0.00042 0.00057
57 0.00056  0.00438  0.00113  0 0.00222 0.00268  1.4E-05 0
58  0.04658 0.03066 0.04186 0.02811 0.00319 3.4E-05 0.00019 0.00646
59  0.02509 0.02135 0.04359 0.02049 0.00087 0.00016 0.00021 4.5E-05
60  0.07773  0.0954 0.05287 0.04624 0.00346 8.6E-05 0.00274 3.4E-05
61  0.06442 0.10447 0.23437 0.14837 0.14063 0.144 0.32029 0.22006
62  0.09107 0.11431 0.15467 0.17438 0.76747 0.83355 0.64276 0.72018
63 0.01677  0.00261  0.00959  0.0012 0.05454 0.01884  0.02551 0.00202
Total  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 
 
Temporary Exports 1990  Reimports 1990 (1992 for Italy) 
      
CN  
Code 
G NL F  I    G NL F  I 
50  0.00433 0.0017 0.0023  0.01018 0 0  0 0
51  0.10896 0.17992  0.0861 0.26776 0.00083 0.00011  0 0.0005
52  0.17972 0.15991 0.05118 0.15626 0.00298 8E-05 0.00027 0.01572
53  0.01188 0.00489 0.00667 0.01474 0 0.0006  0.001 0
54  0.13546 0.11409 0.11493  0.1153 0.00318 0.00033 0.00247 0.00056
55  0.26441 0.32187 0.09895 0.08592 0.00869 0.00021 0.00081 0.00031
56  0.03937 0.02064 0.02224  0.0083 2E-05 0 9.3E-05 0.00166
57  0.00023 0 0 0 0.00206 0 0 0
58  0.04811 0.02987 0.02396  0.0176 0.00014 0 0.00016 0.0002
59  0.02539 0.01734 0.07959 0.01217 0.00084 0  4E-05 0.00013
60  0.05675 0.07661  0.0912 0.03116 0.00029 0.00051 0.00275 7.7E-05
61  0.03779 0.02672 0.30048 0.11175 0.07404 0.08739 0.16907 0.26114
62  0.07791 0.04581  0.1183 0.16793 0.89499 0.90996 0.81439 0.71112
63  0.00969 0.00062 0.00409 0.00094 0.01193 0.00082 0.00896 0.00859
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 
Legenda: CN codes 50-60 identify Textiles; codes 61-63 Apparel. 
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Table 3.7 (b)
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Table 4.1   Results of the pooled least squares regressions 
 
  Dependent variable: OPTSHARE  
  Observations: quarterly data from 1989 to 1996, four countries 
 
        Regression 1      Regression 2      Regression 3      Regression 4   Regression 5 
 
   Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic
Explanatory 
variables 
                 
                   
RELWAGE(i,t-1)   -0.2155  -2.9182  -0.1812 -2.2627 -0.1897 -2.3629 -0.2294  -3.0945 
          
WAGE(i.t-1)           -0.0001 -3.521
          
TARIFF(i,t)   -0.0003  -0.5649      -0.0011 -1.7740
          
FDI(i,t)       -0.00001 -0.6584    
          
FDIno(i)       -0.00001 -0.4198 0.0002  3.0884 
          
DIST(i)   0.0178  3.1787  0.0203 3.2249 0.0269 1.2681     0.0199 3.5519
          
APPSECT(i)   0.4280  0.9726  0.4907 1.1140 0.0396 0.0366 1.1691  1.8941  0.3057 0.7010
          
OPTSHARE(i,t-1)   0.8854  23.4611  0.8653 19.1250 0.8803 23.4198 0.8974  25.4801  0.8718 23.1711
                
                   
   R
2 = 0.9854  R
2 = 0.9855  R
2 = 0.9854  R
2 = 0.9852  R
2 = 0.9859 
                   
Note: An F-test accepted the null hypothesis of pooled least squares being the efficient estimator against the hypothesis of using fixed effects  
          The  constant term of the regressions is not reported to spare space. 
 
Legenda:                  
                  
OPTSHARE(i,t) = re-imports of apparel (NACE Classification 61 and 62) of the EU from country i 
   over re-imports of apparel of the EU from all the CEECs 
RELWAGE(i,t-1) = ratio of average wage level in CEEC i over average wage level in the EU 
WAGE(i.t-1) = average wage level in country i 
TARIFF(i,t) = average tariff level imposed by the EU on imports from country i 
FDI(i,t) = cumulated value of flows of FDI in country i 
FDIno(i) = cumulated number of FDI operation undertaken by the EU in country i in 1996  
DIST(i) = dummy variable for the relative distance of country i from the EU border 
APPSECT(i) = share of the apparel sector output over total manufacturing output in country i in 1990 
                  
i = country index     
t = time index 
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Table 4.2  Translog functional form of  the re-import function  
  Parameter  estimates 
            
   ISUR    I3SLS 
    Coeff.value  t-statistic    Coeff.value   t-statistic 
            
α Bul   0.0177 3.6893 0.0041 0.5669 
α Pol   0.1713 3.5409 -0.0407 -0.4405 
α Rum   0.0241 0.9299 -0.0975 -1.7721 
α Hun   0.0442 1.9328 0.0651 1.7973 
β Bul,Bul   -0.0093 -2.6580 -0.0028 -0.6381 
β Pol,Pol   -0.0302 -1.7761 -0.0464 -1.8295 
β Rum,Rum   -0.0044 -0.3622 -0.0289 -1.4790 
β  Hun,Hun   -0.0501 -4.4359 -0.0307 -2.2613 
β Bul,Pol   -0.0023 -0.4175 0.0002 0.0319 
β Bul,Rum   -0.0240 -4.5371 -0.0030 -0.3238 
β Bul,Hun   0.0053 1.1716 0.0007 0.1262 
β Pol,Rum   -0.0231 -1.8991 0.0114 0.6234 
β Pol,Hun   0.0342 2.8032 0.0174 1.1696 
β Rum,Hun   0.0155 1.1277 0.0393 1.6141 
δ  Bul   0.0363 0.2343 0.8161 2.7552 
δ  Pol   0.5194 4.1402 1.1041 4.6340 
δ  Rum   0.7500 6.3524 1.3536 5.3458 
δ  Hun   0.9014 14.3417 0.8390 8.8559 
    
R
2 - Bul    0.7997 0.7081  
R
2 - Pol    0.6436 0.5636  
R
2 - Rum    0.7757 0.6935  
R
2 - Hun    0.9616 0.9701  
    
Note: the coefficients are the ones of system (4.2). 
        Estimation period 1989 - 1996, quarterly observations. 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 